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1. INTRODUCTION 
Several popular public-key cryptosystems base their security on the problem 
of factorising a (typically) two-factor number. The ubiquitous RSA has been 
extensively analysed in this regard (see, for example, [1]) and several results have 
been reported. For example, the equivalence between breaking the cryptosystem 
and factorising the modulus has been proved to be definitely not true when the 
private exponent is low (see [2], [3]). In fact, it has been recently proved that the 
knowledge of RSA ( )de,  parameters yields the factorisation of the modulus n in 
deterministic polynomial time (see [4]), a result much longed for. 
The quest for improved and new factorisation methods has been very active as 
well. It is obvious that if these improved or new algorithms prove eventually to be 
effective, they could pose a severe drawback for the practical use of this type of 
cryptosystems. 
                                                          
1 Partially supported by CDTI, Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio 
(Spain) in collaboration with Telefónica I+D, Project SEGUR@ with reference 
CENIT-2007 2004 and Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación of Spain under 
MTM2008-01386. 
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Factorisation algorithms can be broadly divided into two groups: General 
Number Field Sieve, Quadratic Sieve, Elliptic Curve, etc., and the so-called 1±p  
algorithms, which try to factor 1+p  or 1−p  for some factor p of the number n 
under test. Among this type of algorithms, Pollard’s ([5]) and Williams’ ([6]) 
algorithms are the most remarkable ones. 
While no precise analysis exists about their running times, the 1±p  
algorithms are particularly useful when 
1. all the prime factors of 1±p  are small; 
2. all the prime factors of 1±p  are small but for one factor q, such that 
1+q  or 1−q  has small prime factors. 
Primes not fulfilling the conditions above might be called “strong”, since they 
are resilient to this kind of factorisation attack, but authors fail to agree on a precise 
definition. While several authors have used the definition above, such as Gordon 
([7], [8]), or Shawe-Taylor ([9],[10]), one can find other authors who give a more 
restricted definition for “strong” primes, such as Ogiwara ([11]), or Laih et al 
([12]). 
Closely related to the notion of “strong” prime, there exists also the notion of 
“safe” prime, for which a lot of literature can be found as well: see, for example, 
[13], [14], [15], [16]. 
The use of safe primes for certain applications has been recommended: For 
example, for the “modulus” of RSA ([17]), in order to avoid the attacks of the 
1±p  algorithms. Safe primes are also interesting for the BBS generator ([18]), 
since to obtain the longest cycle lengths for this generator, it suffices to have 
qpn ⋅= , where both p and q are safe primes and n is the modulus for BBS. (see 
also [19]). 
In a forthcoming section, we will present the concept of signature and we will 
explain that positive signature is the only case that has received a detailed attention 
in the literature (see, for example, [20], [21], [22], [23]). For this reason, in this 
paper we will deal more profoundly with negative signatures, since they have not 
been considered, as far as we know. We have advanced some of our results in 
previous publications ([24]) but they did not include formal proofs, which we do 
offer in this work. 
The paper is organised as follows. First of all, we discuss the definition and 
basic properties of higher-order safe primes, and we give an explicit formula to 
compute the density of this type of primes, which depends on the conjectures of 
Bateman-Horn [25], which in turn depend on those of Hardy-Littlewood [26]. We 
also revisit the concept of chains of safe primes and report on the most recent 
records. 
We then focus our attention on negative signatures following the more relaxed 
definition given in [21] for safe primes. This definition can be seen as a certain 
generalisation of the “classical” prime chains. For this type of primes, we provide 
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explicit conditions to find primes fulfilling a particular set of conditions and give 
some examples. 
2. SAFE PRIMES 
In this Section we introduce the definition of safe primes and some elementary 
properties. 
2.1. Definition and elementary properties 
DEFINITION 1 An odd prime integer p is said to be k-safe with signature ( )kεε ,,1 K , with }1,1{,,1 −+∈kεε K , if k odd prime integers kpp ,,1 K  exist such 
that kkk pppppp εεε +=+=+= − 2,,2,2 122111 K .The integer k is termed the 
order of the signature. 
NOTATION 2 The set of prime numbers is denoted by . For every 0>k , the 
set of k-safe prime integers with signature ( )kεε ,,1 K  is denoted by ( )kεε ,,1 K . 
We set =+k ( )kεε ,,1 K  when 11 +=== kεε K , and =−k ( )kεε ,,1 K  when 
11 −=== kεε K . 
PROPOSITION 3 If 5>p  is a k-safe prime integer with signature ( )kεε ,,1 K , 
then 
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Proof We proceed by induction on k. Remark that 1p  is a ( )1−k -safe prime 
with signature kk εεεε =′=′ −121 ,,K . For 1=k , 1p  is odd since 5>p ; hence 
121 += qp , and then qp 21 22 ++= ε , which is equivalent to the formula in the 
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thus concluding. ■ 
COROLLARY 4 The sets of k-safe prime integers with distinct signatures are 
disjoint, namely, ( )IK kεε ,,1 ( ) ∅=′′ kεε ,,1 K , if ( ) ( ).,,,, 11 kk εεεε ′′≠ KK  
Proof Let kii l ≤<<≤ K11  be the values of the index h for which 1+=hε . It 
suffices to take into account that when ( )kεε ,,1 K  run all possible values, the 
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numbers ( ) ∑∑∑ == −= − +=++=+ lj ikh hhkh hhk j11 11 1 2121122 εε  run all the odd 
integers less than 12 +k  only once. We conclude by virtue of PROPOSITION 3. ■ 
COROLLARY 5 If ( ) ∅=kεε ,,1 K , then ( ) ∅=lεε ,,1 K  for .kl >  
REMARK 6 The order of the components in the signature is relevant, because it 
can occur that ( ) ≠kεε ,,1 K ( ) ( )( )kππ εε ,,1 K  for a given permutationπ of 
{ }k,,1K . For example, ∈7 ( )1,1 −+  and ∉7 ( )1,1 +− , as follows from 
COROLLARY 4. 
2.2 Chains of safe primes 
The definition of safe primes that we have given above, see DEFINITION 1, is 
related to the concept of “chain of primes”. In the literature, there exist a number of 
different kinds of prime chains: Cunningham chains, Shanks chains, etc. Only 
Cunningham chains are closely related to our notion of safe prime chains. 
A Cunningham chain (see, for example, [27,A7], [28]) is a sequence of 2≥k  
prime integers kpp ,,1 K  such that ε+=+ ii pp 21 , 1,,1 −= ki K , { }.1,1 +−∈ε  
Observe that if ,2=k  then a Cunningham chain of length 2 is simply a pair 
( )12, +qq  and, therefore, q is a Sophie Germain prime (see [29], [30]). 
Recent records for Cunningham chains have been obtained by P. Carmody and 
P. Jobling, for 1=ε , and by T. Forbes (see [31]) for 1−=ε . In both cases, the 
length of the longest chain is 16=k , and the first terms are 
=1p 810433818265726529159 for 1=ε  and =1p 3203000719597029781 for 
1−=ε . Both results are reported in [32]. 
3. DENSITY OF k-SAFE PRIMES 
NOTATION 7 The counting function for k-safe primes is defined as  
∈=± pk {#π }: xpk ≤±   
LEMMA 8 Suppose sfff ,,, 21 K  are distinct irreducible polynomials with 
integral coefficients and positive leading coefficients, and suppose F is their 
product. Let ( )NQF  be the number of positive integers j between 1 and N inclusive 
such that ( ) ( ) ( )jfjfjf s,,, 21 K  are all primes. Then for large N we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ).loglog!2 sssF NNoNNFCsNQ −− +≤   
Moreover the constant ( )FC  is given by 
( ) ( )∏ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
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s
p
p
p
FC ,111 ω  (1) 
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and ( )pω  denotes the number of solutions of the congruence ( ) ( )pXF mod0≡ . 
The proof can be found in the reference above. As a result, the reference [25] states 
the following conjecture: 
CONJECTURE 9 With the same assumptions and notation as in LEMMA 8, the 
following formula is conjectured: 
( ) ( ) ( )∫ −−−−≅ N ssF duuFChhhNQ
2
11
2
1
1 ,logL  (2) 
where shhh ,,, 21 K  stand for the degrees of the polynomials sfff ,,, 21 K . 
This conjecture has not been proved so far, but it has been confirmed by many 
numerical experiments, such as those supplied by the same authors in [25] for the 
particular case of the polynomials x, 12 ++ xx . 
Obviously this result is applicable to the case of the k-safe primes. 
THEOREM 10 Under the CONJECTURE 9, the following asymptotic expression 
is obtained: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ,12
2
1ln
2
1
122
1
1∫ −±
−−
±
+ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −≅ x
k
k
kkk kk dttFCx mπ   
where ( )FC  is as in formula (1). 
Proof In fact, if ∈x ±k , then the following conditions must hold 
simultaneously: 
1. x is a prime integer, 
2. ( )1211 mxx =  is a prime integer, 
3. ( ) ( )341121 12 mm xxx ==  is a prime integer, 
… 
.1+k  ( ) ( )1221121 1 −== − kkkk xxx mm  is a prime integer. 
 
Let kxy =  in the previous expressions. If we solve for ix  in (1)– ( )1+k , we 
obtain, ( ) ( ) ( ).122,,12, 121 −±=±== + kkk yfyyfyyf K  Then, ( )122 −±= kk yx  
will belong to ±k  if all the polynomials ( )yfi  for 11 +≤≤ ki  take on a prime 
value for some integer y (that must be also a prime, since ( ) yyf =1 ). 
The k-safe prime counting function is related to the function FQ  defined in 
LEMMA 8, as follows: ( ) ( )( ),122 −±= ± kkkF yyQ π  or, equivalently, 
( )( ) ( ).12
2
1 xxQ k
k
kF
±=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ − πm   
By simply applying the formula (2), we have 
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( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )∫ − −−± ≈⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −=
12
2
1
2
1 .ln12
2
1 kk x kk
kFk duuFCxQ
m
mπ  
If we set ( )( )1221 −= kk tu m , ,21 dtdu k=  then we obtain 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) .12
2
1ln
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1 1
122 1
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Hence, it only remains to compute the value of the constant ( )FC  as defined in the 
formula (1). In order to compute ( )pω , we first define the following sets: 
( ) { } .1,,0,1,12|:, −=≤≤+−= − khkihpipkV hih K   
Then, we have 
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4. CHAINS OF GENERALISED SAFE PRIMES 
The case of positive signatures has received a detailed attention in the 
literature; see [20], [21], [22], [23], where even more general results than those of 
THEOREM 10 above, have been obtained. The negative signatures, however, have 
not been studied as far as we know, and, consequently, we shall deal with them 
below. 
Following [21] basically, we first relax the requirement in DEFINITION 1 of 
chains of safe primes by considering chains of the form 
kkkk pappappap εεε +=+=+= − 2,,2,2 12221111 K  (3) 
for some positive integers ( )kaaa ,,1 K= , which are assumed to be small enough 
with respect to the sizes of the prime integers kpp ,,1 K . 
DEFINITION 11 The counting function επ a  for k-safe prime numbers of 
signature ( )kεεε ,,1 K=  and vector ( )kaaa ,,1 K=  is defined to be the number 
( )xaεπ  of ∈p  such that xp ≤ , and equation (3) holds. 
4.1 Vector with equal components a  
First, let us state the following result: 
THEOREM 12 Under the CONJECTURE 9, if ap  is the least prime divisor of 
12 −a , then the density of the chains in the equation (3) for the vector with equal 
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components aaa k ===K1 , and for 11 −=== kεε K , vanishes for all 
1−≥ apk . In particular, this holds if 12 −a  is a prime. 
Proof From formula (1), it becomes apparent that it suffices to prove ( ) aa pp =ω . In fact, as a computation shows, we have 
( ) ( ) ( )∑ = −+ −= hl hhh ayayf 1 11 ,22    .0 kh ≤≤  
Hence 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )∏ = + −−≡= kh ah pkyyyyfyF 0 1 mod1 L . 
As 1−≥ apk , the result follows. 
THEOREM 13 Let aaa k ===K1 , 11 −=== kεε K  and ap  be as in 
THEOREM 12, and let ( ) ∈= paD { }|: ap be the set of prime divisors of ∈a . 
Assume .2−≤ apk  Then, 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
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( )pae ,2  being the order of 2a in ∗p . 
Proof First of all, let us compute ( )FC . 
1. If ( )12 −∉ aDp , then plra +=−12 , 11 −≤≤ pr , ∈l . Hence 
( )pra mod12 +≡ , and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )p
r
ryryf
h
h
h mod
111
1
1
−+−+=
+
+ , 
.0 kh ≤≤  
a. If 1−= pr , then ( ) ( )pyfh mod11 −=+  for every ;0 kh ≤≤  
hence, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∏ = ++ −== kh kh pyfyF 0 11 mod1 , and 
consequently ( ) 0=pω . This case occurs when either 2=p  
or .| ap  
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b. If 2>p  and ( ) 1,gcd =ap , then 21 −≤≤ pr  and ( )yF  
decomposes into 1+k  linear factors, i.e., 
( ) ( )∏ = −= kh hyyyF 0 , with 
 
( ) ( ) .0,mod11 khp
r
r
r
ry
h
h ≤≤+−+=
−
 
Then, ,hh yy ′=  ,0 khh ≤′<≤  if and only if 
( ) ( ).mod11 pr hh =+ −′  Hence ( ) ,,2 μpaehh +=′  
( ) .,2,,1 ⎥⎦
⎥⎢⎣
⎢ −=
pae
hkKμ  Accordingly, 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≥
≤++=
),2( if),,2(
),2(1 if,1
)(
paekpae
paekk
pω  
2. If ( )12 −∈ aDp , then 2−≤ pk . Hence the number of roots of the 
congruence ( ) ( )( )phyyF k
h
mod
0∏ = −=  is 1+k , thus implying that ( ) .1+= kpω  
With the same notations as in the previous sections we obtain  
( ) ( )( ) ( )xaxaQ akkF επ=⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −+ 1221 . 
Hence, 
( ) ( )( ) ( )∫ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+ −−−≅ 12
122
2
1lna
axa k
a
k
k
duuxεπ  
and, finally, letting ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+= −
12
122
a
atau
k
k , the result follows. ■ 
4.2 Vector with unequal components a  
In the case of a vector with unequal components ( )kaaa ,,1 K=  the results are 
not so concrete as those in the previous section. First of all, we introduce some 
notations: 
∏ − +−=− ≤≤≤≤= jk hkl ljhhj hjkha1 ,0,1,2α  (4) 
∑−
=
≤≤+=
1
1
,1,1
h
l
hlh khαβ  (5) 
{ } ( ){( ∈∪= − 010 :mod0# hhhkp pN αβα })khp ≤≤∗ 1,  (6) 
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THEOREM 14 Let p be a prime number. We consider the notations in equations 
(4)–(6). If either an index kh ≤≤1  exists such that ( )ph mod00 ≡α  and 
( )ph mod0≡β , or pN kp = , then ( ) pp =ω , and hence ( ) .0=FC  
Proof The proof runs similarly to the previous cases just taking into account 
the following expressions: ( ) ( ) .1,, 011 khyyfyyf hhh ≤≤−== + βα  
REMARK 15 Let ( )U kh ha Dp ≤≤= 1 0α . If 1+≥ app , then ( )ph mod00 ≡α  for 
every .1 kh ≤≤  
THEOREM 16 With the same assumptions and notations as in Theorem 14 and 
REMARK 15, if { ∈p } ( )(U kh hDk ≤≤⊆+≤ 1 012: α \ ( ))hD β  
then ( ) pp <ω  for every ∈p  and hence, ( ) .0>FC  
EXAMPLE 17 For 6=k  if we consider all the subsets { } { }18,19,20,15,16,17,1,12,13,147,8,9,10,12,3,4,5,6,,, 61 ⊂aa K , 
then the exact number of vectors ( )61 ,, aaa K=  fulfilling the hypotheses of 
THEOREM 16 is 304. This result has been computed using MAPLE, a mathematical 
software package. 
From the possible 6-tuples obtained above, we supply, as an example, the case 
when ( )18,195,6,14,15,=ar . We, then, have 
( ) { } ( ) { } ( ) { },19,5,3,2,19,3,2,19,2 302010 === ααα DDD  ( ) ( ) ( ) { }.19,7,5,3,2605040 === ααα DDD  
Similarly, ( ) ( ) { } ( ) { } ( ) { },2393,13,101,11,37, 4321 ===∅= ββββ DDDD  
( ) { } ( ) { }.1097,83,41,1549,241 65 == ββ DD  
Hence { } ( ) ( )( ) { }.19,7,5,3,272:
61
0 =−⊆≤≤∈
≤≤
U
h
hh DDpPp βα  For such values 
of a  the following ten numbers are safe primes of length 6=k  and negative 
signature: 
157213815390109, 448585785745309, 
1025803746270109, 3371555445649309, 
3933752569182109, 3948661711710109, 
6787362449041309, 7090927318033309, 
7228241182609309, 8204853725406109. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we introduce the definition of higher-order safe primes and 
discuss their basic properties. We revisit the concept of chains of safe primes and 
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report on the most recent records. We then focus our attention on negative 
following the more relaxed definition given in [21] for safe primes. This definition 
can be seen as a certain generalisation of the “classical” prime chains. For this type 
of primes, and based on the conjectures of Bateman-Horn ([25])—which in turn 
depend on those of Hardy-Littlewood ([26])—we provide explicit conditions to 
find primes fulfilling a particular set of conditions, thus allowing the design of 
algorithms to find them. Finally, we give some examples, obtained using 
algorithms implemented in MAPLE. 
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